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CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF AGENCY PRIVILEGE
The Constitution establishes three separate branches of government,
each exercising its powers within a system of checks and balances provid-
ing controls by each branch over the others.' Each branch must exercise its
powers in an atmosphere of cooperation with the others, while seeking to
preserve its constitutional autonomy. One area in which conflict has arisen
is the assertion of executive-branch autonomy in the face of investigative
actions of the legislative branch. The merits of this assertion of autonomy
by the executive branch have been discussed and debated under the head-
ing "executive privilege."'2 Discussion of executive-branch privilege has,
however, focused on assertions of privilege by the President, leaving as-
sertions of privilege by members of the executive agencies and departments
unanalyzed.
This note seeks to provide an introductory and largely historical
analysis of "agency privilege:" 3 the refusal of federal executive officials to
furnish information and documents to congressional bodies absent the
invocation of a claim of privilege by the President. After a brief survey of
the origins of agency privilege in part 1, the history and nature of the com-
1 See generally M. FORKOSCH, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 11-14 (2d ed. 1969).
2 See, e.g., Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 1044, 1288 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Berger]. Cf. Bishop, The Executive's
Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477 (1957);
Kramer & Marcuse, Executive Privilege-A Study of the Period 1953-1960, 29 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 623, 827 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Kramer & Marcuse]; Project-
Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971, 1015-22
(1975).
The term "executive privilege" was first used in 1958. For a short discussion of
the term's evolution, see R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH
1 n.3 (1974).
3 The term was first used by Elmer Staats, Comptroller General of the United
States. Staats distinguished agency privilege from executive privilege:
A far more common problem arises from a practice which might be
characterized as "department" or "agency privilege" whereby executive
officials refuse to furnish us particular records or documents which they
do not consider appropriate for our review. Such refusals do not pur-
port to represent assertions of executive privilege; and we are unaware
of any legal authority which even arguably supports the arrogation of
such discretion on the part of agency officials.
1 Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations of the Senate
Comm. on Government Operations and the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers and
Administrative Practice amnd Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Joint Hearings].
Senator Edmund Muskie noted:
I see we have a new phrase in the language now, "agency privilege,"
and I suppose we ought to consider whether or not we need to define
that in statutory language in order to control it.
Id. at 125.
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peting interests of congressional investigations and autonomy of executive
departments and agencies will be discussed in part II. Part III explores the
constitutional basis of the claim and analyzes other justifications proffered
in specific circumstances. Part IV weighs the merits of various proposals
to establish a proper role for agency privilege.
I. ORIGIN OF AGENCY PRIVILEGE
The concept of agency privilege first arose when President Kennedy at-
tempted to establish procedures for the exercise of executive-branch
privilege. 4 During the Eisenhower administration (1953-60), debate over
the existence and limitations of a privilege claimed by the President on
behalf of the entire executive branch had engendered criticism of the
assertion of executive privilege. 5 Although pre-1960 assertions of agency
privilege have been documented in writings on executive-branch privilege,"
little distinction has been drawn between assertions of executive and agency
privilege.7 During the Kennedy administration, all assertions of executive-
branch privilege required presidential participation.8 Presidents Johnson
4 President Kennedy's definition of the procedures which qualified for executive
privilege left those assertions of privilege which did not qualify in the separate agency
privilege category. See note 8 infra.
5 The debate arose in connection with the conflict between the Eisenhower ad-
ministration and the "Army-McCarthy Hearings." Hearings Before the Special
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations, "83d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
President Eisenhower's letter of May 17, 1954, prohibiting all executive employees
from testifying in the interest of "efficient and effective administration," was pro-
voked by the actions of Senator McCarthy. 1 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 93.
For a sample of the writing and thinking of the period, see Hearing Before the
Subcomn. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); Wiggins, Government Operations and the Public's Right to
Know, 19 FED. B.J. 62 (1959); Younger, Congressional Investigations and Executive
Secrecy: A Study in the Separation of Powers, 20 U. PITT. L. REV. 755 (1959).
6 See Kramer & Marcuse, supra note 2, at 627-68.
7 Bernard Schwartz points out that the older position using the broader concept of
executive privilege was reflected in Attorney General opinions:
Not suprisingly perhaps, there has been a plethora of Attorney General
ipse dixits which have invariably supported the claims of the executive
to withhold information. Thus, in a memorandum to the President of
May 17, 1954, the Attorney General asserted categorically that "our
Presidents have established . . . that they and members of their Cab-
inets and other heads of executive departments have an undoubted
privilege and discretion to keep confidential, in the public interest,
papers and information which require secrecy."
1 B. SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
145-46 (1963) [hereinafter cited as B. SCHWARTZ].
Recent writers recognize a more narrow definition of executive privilege. One
commentator states, "Throughout this work 'executive privilege' refers to the direct
invocation of [privilege] by the president rather than 'privilege' claimed by a host of
subordinates." A. BRECKENRIDGE, THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 2 (1974).
8 President Kennedy announced his policy of executive privilege in his response
to a question from Representative John Moss:
[T/his Administration has gone to great lengths to achieve full coopera-
tion with the Congress in making available to it all appropriate docu-
ments, correspondence and information. That is the basic policy of
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and Nixon also established policies with respect to executive branch
privilege which incorporated the requirement of presidential assertion of
the privilege. 9 Nevertheless, during this period the number of claims of
privilege which did not conform to these established procedures for ob-
this Administration, and it will continue to be so. Executive privilege
can be invoked only by the President and will not be used without
specific Presidential approval.
Letter from President Kennedy to Representative John Moss, March 7, 1962 (em-
phasis added), Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Senate
Judiciary Committee Hearing].
9 President Johnson followed President Kennedy's policy:
Since assuming the Presidency, I have followed the policy laid down
by President Kennedy in his letter to you of March 7, 1962, dealing
with this subject. Thus, the claim of "executive privilege" will continue
to be made only by the President.
Letter from President Johnson to Representative John Moss, April 2, 1965, Senate
Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 8, at 35.
On April 7, 1969, President Nixon not only made a similar reply to a letter from
Representative Moss but also issued the following procedural memorandum to all
executive departments and agencies:
The policy of this Administration is to comply to the fullest extent
possible with Congressional requests for information. While the Ex-
ecutive branch has the responsibility of withholding certain information
the disclosure of which would be incompatible with the public interest,
this Administration will invoke this authority only in the most com-
pelling circumstances and after a rigorous inquiry into the actual need
for its exercise. For those reasons Executive privilege will not be used
without specific Presidential approval. The following procedural steps
will govern the invocation of Executive privilege:
1. If the head of an Executive department or agency (hereinafter re-
ferred to as "department head") believes that compliance with a request
for information from a Congressional agency addressed to his depart-
ment or agency raises a substantial question as to the need for invoking
Executive privilege, he should consult the Attorney General through the
Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice.
2. If the department head and the Attorney General agree, in accor-
dance with the policy set forth above, that Executive privilege shall not
be invoked in the circumstances, the information shall be released to
the inquiring Congressional agency.
3. If the department head and the Attorney General agree that the cir-
cumstances justify the invocation of Executive privilege, or if either of
them believes that the issue should be submitted to the President, the
matter shall be transmitted to the Counsel to the President, who will
advise the department head of the President's decision.
4. In the event of a Presidential decision to invoke Executive privilege,
the department head should advise the Congressional agency that the
claim of Executive privilege is being made with the specific approval
of the President.
5. Pending a final determination of the matter, the department head
should request the Congressional agency to hold its demand for the in-
formation in abeyance until such determination can be made. Care
shall be taken to indicate that the purpose of this request is to protect
the privilege pending the determination, and that the request does not
constitute a claim of privilege.
Memorandum, Establishing a Procedure to Govern Compliance with Congressional
Demands for Information, March 24, 1969; id. at 36-37. See A. BRECKENRIDGE,
THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 64-68 (1974), for a discussion of the approach of Presi-
dents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon to executive-branch privilege.
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taining presidential approval of the privilege increased. 10 Documented as-
sertions of privilege by members of the executive branch between 1964 and
1973 number as many as 160, the vast majority of which did not fall within
the guidelines for claiming executive privilege then in effect.11 The effect
was the creation of a growing number of assertions of privilege which did
not fall within the scope of prior analysis of executive privilege.
II. AUTONOMY OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES
AND THE CONGRESSIONAL NEED FOR INFORMATION
A. Congressional Investigatory Power
The Constitution does not specifically confer investigatory power upon
Congress. 12 The Supreme Court has, however, recognized such a power,
basing its finding on the congressional lawmaking function13 and the
necessary and proper clause, 14 in McGrain v. Daugherty.'5 During a Sen-
ate investigation of the Teapot Dome affair, which involved the Department
of Justice,' 6 the investigating committee issued a subpoena commanding
10 A research study by the Library of Congress based on a review of newspapers
and congressional publications found three invocations of agency privilege during
the Kennedy administration (1961-63), two during the Johnson administration
(1963-69), and fifteen during the first term of the Nixon administration (1969-73).
GOVERNMENT AND GENERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE
PRESENT LIMITS OF "EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE," 3 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at
222-26 [hereinafter cited as LIBRARY OF CONGRESS STUDY].
11 1 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 101. The larger number of reported assertions
reflected here is due to the fact that this survey used committee chairmen themselves
as sources, while the Library of Congress study relied on newspapers and con-
gressional publications. The Library of Congress approach was likely to pick the
majority of the assertions within the guidelines, as those would be more likely to
receive publicity through presidential involvement.
12 See 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 121. In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S.
135, 161 (1927), the Court stated:
[Tlhere is no provision expressly investing either house with power to
make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise
its legislative function advisedly and effectively.
13 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
14 Id.
15 273 U.S. 135 (1927). The Court stated:
We are of the opinion that the power of inquiry-with process to en-
force it-is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function.... [T]he provisions are not of doubtful meaning, but, as was
held by this Court in the cases we have reviewed, are intended to be
effectively exercised, and therefore to carry with them such auxiliary
powers as are necessary and appropriate to that end.
Id. at 174-75. For a brief history of congressional power to inquire into
executive conduct, see Berger, supra note 2, at 1053-66. As to Congress' power to
investigate, see 1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 120-48.
16 Although the McGrain case did not directly concern the subpoena of a member
of a department or agency, the Court responded to a lower-court statement that
the Senate was in actuality putting the Attorney General on trial by stating that the
investigation was within the power to legislate.
[Tihe functions of the Department of Justice, the powers and duties of
the Attorney General and the duties of his assistants, are all subject
to regulation by congressional legislation, and . . . the department is
WINTER 1*976]
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the appearance of Mally S. Daugherty, brother of the United States Attor-
ney General and an Ohio banker, to give testimony and to bring with him
certain bank records. Rather than appear, Daugherty secured a writ of
habeas corpus on the ground that the Senate had exceeded its powers. The
Court vacated the writ in an opinion recognizing the broad scope of the
congressional power of inquiry. 17 The Court regarded investigative power
as a necessary attribute of the power to legislate,' 8 and refused to place
any clearly defined limits upon congressional power to investigate depart-
ments and agencies. 19
The necessity for the factfinding role of Congress has expanded apace
with the increasing size of the executive bureaucracy. 20 In the first two-
thirds of the nation's history, congressional investigations proceeded on a
sporadic basis. The House of Representatives conducted its first investiga-
tion in 1827, and the Senate initiated its first investigation in 1859.21 When
Congress felt the need to investigate, special committees were formed.
22
The committees were not designed to provide continuous information, since
the congressional actions creating them gave only a specific delegation of
maintained and its activities are carried on under such appropriations as
in the judgment of Congress are needed from year to year.
273 U.S. 135, 178 (1927). Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957) (involving
the reversal of a conviction of an individual for refusal to answer a congressional
committee question where the subject of the inquiry was not made known), does not
alter the Court's position on this point.
In Watkins ... the high Court declared that congressional investigatory
authority did not include the power "to expose for the sake of ex-
posure." It should, nevertheless, be emphasized that this limitation has
no application to inquiries into the operation of the executive. In such
inquiries, there is not the same danger of exposure for exposure's
sake that may exist in a case like Watkins, which concerned only the
investigation of a private individual.
1 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 129. The Watkins opinion, in fact, starts with the
following "basic premises:"
The power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the
legislative process. That power is broad. . . . It comprehends probes
into departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, in-
efficiency or waste.
354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
I 273 U.S. 135, 173-76 (1927).
18 Id. at 174.
19 Raoul Berger has stated:
If I have not misread history, the power of legislative inquiry into ex-
ecutive conduct at the time of the Constitution was virtually unlimited;
and on the whole it has served the democratic process well.
Berger, supra note 2, at 1319-20. In the executive privilege area, in contrast, dif-
ferent conclusions have been drawn from the lack of clear constitutional limits. In
Kramer & Marcuse, supra note 2, at 904-05, the authors argue that the founding
fathers sought to prevent a despotic legislature through creation of an equally strong
executive.
23 In the first 120 years of the nation, about one-third of the federal peacetime
agencies were formed. In the next thirty years, between 1900 and 1930, the number
doubled. With the New Deal, agencies were created at a more accelerated rate.
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 6, 8 (3d ed. 1972).
21 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 193 (1957).
2 2 Maslow, Fair Procedure in Congressional Investigations: A Proposed Code, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 839-40 (1954).
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investigatory power and a limited existence.23 But in this same period of
our history, only about one-third of our present executive agencies were
formed. 24 As the expansion of the executive branch accelerated in the
early part of this century, the greater number of informational sources as
well as the increase in the mass and complexity of available data pres-
sured Congress to develop more efficient methods of gathering informa-
tion. 25 The Legislative Reorganization Act of 194626 gave significant
impetus to the information-seeking role of Congress through the grant of
subpoena powers to standing committees of Congress.2 7 The Act also
improved the flow of information between Congress and the General Ac-
counting Office (GAO), which was established in 192128 as an investigative
arm of Congress, 29 and directed that the GAO perform an expenditure
analysis of each executive agency. 30 Later legislation continued to refine
the GAO's role.
31
The lawmaking power is not the only constitutional support for the con-
gressional information-gathering role. The President has a constitutional
duty to provide information to Congress concerning the state of the
union. 32 Article I, section 3 of the Constitution provides that the President
is directed "from time to time to give to the Congress information of the
23 Id.
24 See note 20 supra.
25 The Joint Committee formed to investigate proposed changes in the organization
of Congress echoed the need in its report:
Public affairs are now handled by a host of administrative agencies
headed by nonelected officials with only casual oversight by Congress.
• ..Under these conditions . .. the time is ripe for Congress to re-
consider its role in the American scheme of government and to modern-
ize its organization and procedures.
REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS PURSUANT TO
H.R. CON. RES. 18, S. REP. No. 1011, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1947).
26 60 Stat. 812 (1946).
2- The Senate gave all fifteen standing committees subpoena powers and a scope
of inquiry limited only by the jurisdiction of the committee. Legislative Reorgani-
zation Act § 134(a), 60 Stat. 831-32 (1946). In the House of Representatives only
the Committee on Un-American Activities was given subpoena power by the Act.
Legislative Reorganization Act § 121(b), 60 Stat. 828-29 (1946). The rules of the
House of Representatives have expanded a committee's authorized subpoena power,
however, and the House has been very willing to authorize specific inquiries. Maslow,
supra note 22, at 839-40. In Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190 (1880), the
Supreme Court likened the scope of authority of the congressional subpoena power
to that of the judiciary. See Note, Executive Privilege and the Congress: Perspectives
and Recommendations, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 692, 699 (1974), for a historical develop-
ment of congressional subpoena power.
28 Budget and Accounting Act, 42 Stat. 20 (1921).
29 Id. Prior to this time, Congress had relied on language in statutes and on in-
ternal checks within the executive branch, supplemented occasionally by congressional
investigations of matters which attracted national attention. The General Accounting
Office investigates all matters relating to the receipt and expenditure of public funds.
R. BROWN, THE GAO, UNTAPPED SOURCE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER 10-11 (1970).
30 Legislative Reorganization Act § 206, 60 Stat. 837 (1946). See R. BROWN,
supra note 29, at 12.
31 R. BROWN, supra note 29, at 13-18.
.12 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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state of the union." The extent of this duty is much debated,33 but it is
difficult to conclude from a literal reading of the Constitution that an
annual speech meets the duty imposed by the clause.3 4 The annual state of
the union message is more a creature of tradition than of constitutional
law.3
5
Arguably, the state of the union clause gives Congress the right to know
everything about executive departments and agencies.3 6 Support for this
position is available from the British parliamentary system,3 7 under which
33 Some have argued that the President determines the scope of this duty:
Today there is no subject on which the President may not appropriately
communicate to Congress, in as precise terms as he chooses, his concep-
tion of its duty. Conversely, the President is not obligated by this clause
to impart information which, in his judgment, should in the public
interest be withheld.
2 L. JAYSON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 537 (1973).
Bernard Schwartz has commented that, "The duty to communicate to Congress is
one whose fulfillment is wholly discretionary with the President." 1 B. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 7, at 27.
Raoul Berger, on the other hand, believes that the duty may be much more
expansive:
It is more reasonable to read the "state of the nation" phrase as im-
posing a duty to furnish information which the Grand Inquest was
historically authorized to require.
Berger, supra note 2, at 1077. The term "Grand Inquest" refers to investigations
by the British Parliament, the scope of which Berger asserts are determinative of
the scope of congressional investigative power. id. at 1069. As to the broad scope
of the Grand Inquest, see id. at 1056-58.
34 As Raoul Berger states, "A good reason for a restrictive reading of the phrase
is yet to be proffered, and it is contrary to common sense." Berger, supra note 2,
at 1077.
35 Bernard Schwartz places emphasis upon what the clause has meant "in practice"
as opposed to what it says "on its face."
Presidential messages to the Congress have been of two kinds. There is,
first of all, the annual message upon the State of the Union and the
budget message. . . . In these messages it has become customary for
the legislative program desired by the Chief Executive to be outlined.
In addition, there are special messages, focused upon particular subjects,
which are normally intended to secure specified congressional action.
2 B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 27. Raoul Berger argues that the clause "has too
mechanically been associated with annual Presidential messages," citing Justice
Story as an advocate for a more literal reading of the clause. Berger, supra note 2,
at 1077.
36 During the 49th Congress, Senator Edmunds, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, in a congressional debate on the subject of relations between the Senate
and the executive departments, stated that the state of the union refers to the
universal power of knowledge and information of the two Houses of
Congress in respect to every operation of the Government of the United
States and every one of its officers, foreign and domestic.
17 CONG. REC. 2215 (1886), cited in Collins, Power of Congressional Committees of
Investigation to Obtain Information from the Executive Branch, 39 GEO. L.J. 563,
569 (1951).
3T Raoul Berger testified:
[I]n a random sampling of parliamentary debates at different periods
stretching from 1621 to 1742, I found legislative oversight of adminis-
tration across the board: Inquiries to lay a foundation for legislation,
into corruption, the conduct of war, execution of the laws, disbursement
of appropriations, in short, into every aspect of executive conduct.
[VOL. 9:348
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the Grand Inquest provided Parliament with an unbridled power to investi-
gate every aspect of executive management, foreign or domestic.38 Early
colonial practice reflected a preference that the colonial legislatures be given
significant investigatory powers.39 The Continental Congress, when creating
the Department of Foreign Affairs, provided that members of Congress
would have access to all -information, including classified documents.
40
In summary, there are evidently no limits on congressional investigative
power, provided that Congress is acting pursuant to a constitutional
function.
B. Autonomy of Executive Departments
and Agencies
The expansion of the Executive, which gave impetus to congressional
expansion of its investigative role, came largely in the form of new federal
agencies. Executive departments cannot trace their origins directly to the
Constitution. 41 The departments and agencies are creatures of legislative
enactment. Created as tools necessary and proper for the enforcement of
laws enacted by Congress, they exist only at the pleasure of Congress.
42
Congress can do more, though, than create or abolish these agencies; it
can apply controls through its annual appropriations, nurturing or stifling
agency operations in varying degrees.
43
Foreign affairs, about which American Presidents have drawn a curtain
of secrecy, were not excepted.
1 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 238.
38 See Berger, supra note 2, at 1056-58. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135
(1927), has been regarded as precedent for turning to Parliamentary history to
determine the scope of congressional investigative power. 1 Joint Hearings, supra
note 3, at 237. See Berger, supra note 2, at 1066.
In actual legislative practice power to secure needed information by
such means has long been treated as an attribute of the power to
legislate. It was so regarded in the British Parliament and in the
Colonial legislatures before the American Revolution; and a like view
has "prevailed into effect in both houses of Congress....
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 161 (1927).
39 See Berger, supra note 2, at 1058-59.
Far from being restricted to eliciting information from private persons,
colonial history thus evinces a sweeping power to inquire into executive
management and the application of public funds, to inquire into official
conduct of the officials themselves and to require them to appear.
Id. at 1059.
40 See id. at 1059.
41 Even departments existing under the Articles of Confederation were not estab-
lished by the Constitution, and in its first session Congress created by statute the De-
partment of Foreign Affairs (now Department of State), Act of July 27, 1789,
ch. 4, 1 Stat. 28, the Department of War, Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 49, and
the Treasury Department, Act of Sept. 2, 1789, ch. 12, 1 Stat. 65. Departments are
only mentioned incidentally in the Constitution, as if their existence were presumed.
C. SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 51 (2d ed. 1954).
42 Berger, supra note 2, at 1100.
43 Kramer and Marcuse argue that the power of Congress to create and abolish
executive agencies is not a power to supervise and control them. Kramer & Marcuse,
supra note 2, at 827. Others, however, point to the significance of the appropriations
power. Berger, supra note 2, at 1112, cites the language of 5 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1958)
WINTER 1976]
Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 9:348
The history of the federal government in large part reflects the growth
of federal agencies. 44 Federal agencies now perform significant quasi-
executive, quasi-judicial, and quasi-legislative functions.45 Agency enabling
legislation has frequently been broad and sweeping, 46 and an expansive
interpretation of congressional grants of power has frequently stood with-
out challenge.47 These features are due, in part, to the widely varied struc-
tures of these agencies, which make categorization and generalization as
to their powers difficult. 48 The solution to many problems has often been
the creation of a new agency. When new problems call for congressional
attention, old ones, with their agencies, may recede from congressional
view. 49 Although federal agencies are thought to be checked by con-
gressional control through enabling legislation and appropriations, execu-
tive supervision, and judicial review of legislation and action,50 they are,
in fact, to a large extent self-supervising. 51
Executive departments and agencies are entities of statutory rather than
constitutional creation, yet, on the basis of executive autonomy, they assert
a privilege against Congress, their creator. The authority for such assertions
must be analyzed in the setting not only of statutory autonomy but also
(now codified at 5 U.S.C. § 2954 (1970)) in support of this proposition:
Every executive department and independent establishment of the
Government shall, upon request of the Committee on expenditures ...
of the House . . . or upon request of the Committee on expenditures
of the Senate . . . furnish any information requested of it relating to
any matter within the jurisdiction of said Committee.
4 4 See note 20 supra.
45 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.02 (1958). The Supreme Court,
referring to the role of administrative bodies, has stated:
They have become a veritable fourth branch of the Government,
which has deranged our three-branch legal theories as much as the
concept of a fourth dimension unsettles our three-dimensional thinking.
Courts have differed in assigning a place to these seemingly necessary
bodies in our constitutional system. Administrative agencies have been
called quasi-legislative, quasi-executive or quasi-judicial, as the oc-
casion required, in order to validate their functions within the separa-
tion-of-powers scheme of the Constitution.
FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952).
46 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 2.04 (3d ed. 1972).
47 Discussing the exercise of the power of selective enforcement by agencies,
Davis points out that
courts acquiesce in the assumption ... of the enormous power of selec-
tive enforcement, which is (a) not only unguided by statutory standards
but often exercised in direct violation of clearly expressed legislative
intent, (b) typically unguided even by administrative standards, (c) typ-
ically unprotected by procedural safeguards, (d) typically exercised by
subordinate officers with little or no supervision, and (e) typically im-
mune to judicial review even when denial of equal justice can readily be
shown.
Id. § 2.07.
48 Parker, The Removal Power of the President and Independent Administrative
Agencies, 36 INO. L.J. 63, 73-74 (1960).
49 See K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 4.08 (3d ed. 1972).
50 See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.09, at 68-69 (1958).
51 Despite this fact, very few agencies are granted independent status in their
enabling legislation. Id. § 1.07 at 51.
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autonomy acquired through separation of powers by the placement of
departments and agencies in the executive branch.
HI. THE AUTHORITY UNDERLYING THE
ASSERTION OF AGENCY PRIVILEGE
A. Constitutional Basis
Separation of powers is at least as basic to the framework of the Con-
stitution as is congressional power to make laws and conduct investigations.
Yet even those who advocate the existence of executive or agency privilege
have failed in their search for a direct constitutional foundation. 52 Instead,
proponents of an extensive privilege argue that nothing in the Constitution
or in the few judicial opinions dealing with the question denies the existence
of executive or agency privilege.53 Even though the Constitution does not
expressly recognize a power of the President to withhold information, it
likewise does not expressly recognize congressional power to investigate,
and, therefore, the latter power has not been shown superior to the former.
54
The fact that Congress has on occasion not contested the assertion of
privilege also has been cited as tacit recognition by Congress that the
privilege exists. 55 This proposition is not conceded by the opponents of
privilege, however.56 Finally, it is argued that the power of Congress to
create and abolish executive agencies is not the power to supervise and
control; Congress has the power of vigilance, not surveillance.57 The effec-
tive opposing argument is that while Congress should not be involved in
the enforcement of laws, there is no reason to limit inquiry after enforce-
ment action has taken place. 58 To grant Congress the right to abolish
agencies without the right to inspect to see whether abolition of the whole
agency is necessary is to force blind action which is likely to exceed what
is necessary to correct the problem. 59
52 Kramer & Marcuse, supra note 2, at 899-903.
53 d. at 899-900.
54Id. at 899-903.
55 Id. In the opinion of then-Attorney General Kleindienst
[s]uch historical practices of one branch of our Government, especially
when acceded by another[,] yield Burkeian rules of constitutional pre-
scription of the highest vitality.
I Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 19.
56 Raoul Berger argues that congressional acquiescence does not create priv-
ilege. 1 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 248. In support of his position, Berger
cites Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.7. 579 (1952). One of the
arguments presented in Youngstown in support of the President's action in directing
the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of many of the nation's steel mills
was that other Presidents had in the past taken possession of private businesses
without congressional authority in order to settle labor disputes. The Court's answer
was that even if that were true it would not have caused any diminution of the ex-
clusive constitutional authority of Congress. 343 U.S. at 588-89.
57 Kramer & Marcuse, supra note 2, at 827.
58 Berger, supra note 2, at 1098-1101.
59Id. at 1100-01.
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Many of the justifications asserted for agency privilege parallel those
claimed for executive privilege: classification of information,6" preservation
of national security,6 ' protection of intelligence sources,6 2 encouragement
of the free exchange of frank opinions, 63 or involvement of a presidential
communication. 64 The similarity of the assertions to those commonly ad-
60 For example, the Defense Department refused to provide a top-secret "Comustat
Plan 1/64" between the United States and Thailand to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee on this ground. N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1969, at 1, col. 7.
The problem of classified information has become a major area of concern. 1 Joint
Hearings, supra note 3, at 262-64. For an analysis of the Executive's ability to
classify information under Exec. Order No. 11652, as amended, Exec. Order No.
11714, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1974), 50 U.S.C. § 401 Note (Supp. 111, 1973) (directive detail-
ing classification and downgrading procedures) and proposed remedies to deal with
excess classification, both as to level of classification and quantity of material, see
I Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 287-93.
61 For example, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird replied to a request for a
copy of the "Pentagon Papers" by Senator Fulbright by noting that it would be con-
trary to the national interest to supply it. R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A
CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 282-85 (1974). Legislation that would limit the exercise of
privilege to direct, personal, and confidential relationships involving matters of
national security and other public policy decisions has been urged. 1 Joint Hearings,
supra note 3, at 134.
62 For example, then-Attorney General Robert Jackson refused to turn over to a
House committee the FBI reports and names of confidential informants it had re-
quested. In summarizing Jackson's reasoning, Raoul Berger states:
Attorney General Jackson reasoned that disclosure would (1) prejudice
law enforcement; (2) be a breach of faith with confidential informants
and thereby impair future efficiency; and (3) interfere with the
president's duty to "take care that the laws are faithfully executed."
R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 212 (1974) (footnote
omitted).
63 For example, the Secretary of the Air Force refused to provide to the
Comptroller General a report by the Inspector General on the basis that it was
necessary to conceal identities to preserve the relationships established by the In-
spector General for obtaining information. Berger, supra note 2, at 1113.
During the "Pentagon Papers" controversy Secretary of Defense Laird asserted that
the papers contained "a variety of internal advice and comments central to the
decision-making process." Letter from Secretary Laird to Senator Fulbright, Dec.
20, 1969, Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 8, at 37. See Comment,
Executive Privilege and the Congress: Perspectives and Recommendations, 23
DEPAUL L. REV. 692, 728-29 (1974), analyzing the need for secrecy with respect to
presidential communications.
64 Secretary of Defense Laird's refusal to turn over the "Pentagon Papers" was
based in part upon the fact that they included "NSC [National Security Council]
papers and other Presidential communications." Letter from Secretary Laird to
Senator Fulbright, Dec. 20, 1969, Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 8,
at 37.
Another Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, has stated that:
The protection of confidential communications between a President and
one of his advisers has classically been considered to be in the national
interest because it insures the full and candid expression of views which
assists the President in discharging his responsibilities.
1 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 55.
65 For example, President Eisenhower's letter of May 17, 1954, to Secretary of
Defense Charles Wilson, directing him to tell his subordinates not to testify during
the Army-McCarthy Hearings, served to encourage subordinates in the executive
branch to use the cloak of executive privilege. Thirty-four such instances occurred
during the remainder of the Eisenhower administration. The executive bureaucracy
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vanced in conjunction with claims of executive privilege reflects in part the
common heritage of the concepts.6 5 But those persons defending an asser-
tion of agency privilege on such grounds are not merely operating under
the mistaken belief that they are properly asserting executive privilege, they
also assert a privilege based on the Constitution which does not depend on
an act of the President for its existence.6 6 In some cases, however, these
assertions of agency privilege are being made with the hope that the agency
can remain under the umbrella of executive privilege without following
presidential-approval procedures.
7
In December 1969, the Department of Defense refused to provide a
copy of the "Pentagon Papers" to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.68
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, in his letter of refusal to Senator J.
William Fulbright, stated: "It would clearly be contrary to the national
interest to disseminate it more widely."' 69 That contention was apparently
based upon the Secretary's own interpretation of the national interest and
did not utilize the executive privilege procedures established by President
Nixon.7 0 The Laird letter not only advanced the national interest as a basis
for agency privilege but also based a claim of privilege on the arguments
that the document contained sensitive National Security Council papers
and presidential communications, that many of the papers included internal
advice central to the decisionmaking process, and that many of the con-
tributors received an express guarantee of confidentiality.71 Secretary
Laird's position remained unchanged after Senator Fulbright pointed out
that executive privilege had not been invoked.
7 2
In February 1963, General Maxwell D. Taylor refused to discuss the
Bay of Pigs invasion while testifying before the House Subcommittee on
Defense Appropriations. 73 His stated reason was that it would result in a
did not change its habits when the cloak ended with the coming of a new adminis-
tration. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS STUDY, supra note 10. at 228. See note 5 supra.
66 In Senator Fulbright's reply to Secretary Laird, he made clear his view of the
Secretary's assertion:
Since this study was not initiated by President Nixon but by former
Secretary McNamara and the doctrine of Executive Privilege has
not been invoked, I again urge that you provide the Committee with
these materials.
Letter from Senator J. William Fulbright to Secretary Melvin Laird, Jan. 19, 1970,
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 8, at 38. Six months later, however,
Secretary Laird reaffirmed his refusal of the request. Letter from Secretary Melvin
Laird to Senator J. William Fulbright, July 21, 1970. Id. at 39.
67 See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS STUDY, supra note 10, at 228. See notes 8, 9 supra.
68 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS STUDY, supra note 10, at 225. Of the fifteen reported
instances of agency privilege during the first term of the Nixon administration
(1969-72), ten involved the Department of Defense. Id. at 225-26.
69 Letter from Secretary Melvin Laird to Senator J. William Fulbright, Dec. 20,
1969, Senate Judiciary Comnittee Hearing, supra note 8, at 38.
70 See note 66 supra.
71 See note 69 supra.
72 Letter from Secretary Melvin Laird to Senator J. William Fulbright, July 21,
1970, Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 8, at 39. This letter specifically
mentioned only the national interest justification without commenting on the executive
privilege issue. See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
73 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS STUDY, supra note 10, at 224-25.
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"highly controversial, divisive public discussion among branches of our
Government .... -"14 General Taylor could point to presidential authority
for his refusal, since President Kennedy had directed General Taylor and
the other members of the board of inquiry into the invasion attempt to
refrain from disclosing their findings to anyone but him. 75 However, Gen-
eral Taylor did not seek specific presidential approval for his refusal to
testify on the matter before the House committee, 76 and therefore did not
comply with the procedure for invoking executive privilege established by
the Kennedy administration.77 Then-Representative Gerald Ford char-
acterized General Taylor's "divisive discussions" justification as less a
matter of national security than of preventing administration embarrass-
ment, pointing out that the gag on board members had been violated by
Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who granted interviews to a newspaper
reporter and a news magazine.
78
In September 1968, the Under Secretary of the Treasury, Joseph W.
Barr, refused to testify during hearings before the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee on the nomination of Abe Fortas as Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court.79 The focus of the hearings had temporarily strayed, and the com-
mittee was seeking information concerning legislation on the subject of
Secret Service protection of presidential candidates. 80 Mr. Barr declined
the invitation to testify on the ground that in the course of work on this
legislation he had discussed the subject matter directly with President
Johnson. 81 This assertion of privilege was not, however, invoked by
74 109 CONG. REC. 5817 (1963).
75 Id.
76 The Library of Congress in its study classified this incident as one of three re-
fusals by executive departments and agencies to provide information which were not
in conformity with established procedures for the exercise of executive privilege
during the Kennedy administration (1961-63). LIBRARY OF CONGRESS STUDY, supra
note 10, at 224-25.
77 See note 8 supra.
78 109 CONG. REC. 5817 (1963).
79 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS STUDY, supra note 10, at 225.
s0 Although the subject matter was arguably within the ambit of Congress' general
power to legislate, it was far from clear that the subject matter was within the scope
of the committee hearings on the confirmation of a Chief Justice. Samuel J. Archibald,
of the Washington Freedom of Information Center, referred to this scope problem in
a letter to Senator James Eastland on Sept. 17, 1968:
Regardless of the absurdity of some of the issues discussed at the hear-
ings on the nomination of Associate Justice Abe Fortas, the principle
of Congressional access to Executive Branch information is too im-
portant to let stand the informal claim of "executive privilege."
114 CONG. REC. 27519 (1968). Mr. Barr did not assert as a basis for refusal that the
committee had exceeded its scope of inquiry. See note 81 infra.
81 Mr. Barr's letter stated in part:
In the development of this legislation, I participated in meetings with
representatives of the White House and discussed the matter directly
with the President.
Based on long-standing precedents, it would be improper for me
under these circumstances to give testimony before a congressional
committee concerning such meetings and discussions.
114 CONG. REC. 27519 (1968).
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President Johnson, as required by executive privilege procedures during
the Johnson administration. 2 Mr. Barr may well have been relying upon
the Eisenhower letter of May 17, 1954, which became the basis of many
claims of privilege by members of the executive department long after the
motive which inspired the letter had passed.8 3 It is possible that such
assertions as those discussed above are supported by secret presidential
orders directing the exercise of executive privilege, 4 but no evidence of
such written orders has emerged.8 5 Such directives might exist where the
request by Congress has attracted widespread national attention."
Many reasons given for assertion of agency privilege are largely proce-
dural: primary responsibility for release in another agency or department;8 7
the tentative nature of a planning document;88 or a custom not to release
such information. 9 Many of the procedural reasons for the assertion of
privilege may actually reflect tactics to prevent the dissemination of infor-
82 As stated by Senator Robert Griffin in inserting the matter into the Congressional
Record, President Johnson, like President Kennedy, had established the policy that
information would not be withheld from Congress unless the President himself in-
voked executive privilege. 114 CONG. REc. 27518 (1968). See note 9 supra.
83 Letter from Samuel J. Archibald, Washington Freedom of Information Center,
to Senator James Eastland, Sept. 17, 1968, 114 CONG. REC. 27519 (1968). See notes
5, 65 supra.
84 The Library of Congress study on the limits of executive privilege implies that a
secret order by President Nixon directing invocation of executive privilege 'would
have been sufficient to have brought the fifteen assertions of agency privilege in his
first term into compliance with his directives with respect to executive privilege.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS STUDY, supra note 10, at 226.
85 Herman Marcuse has stated that none of the agency privilege cases cited in the
Library of Congress report as occurring during the Nixon administration passed
through his office, the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice, as re-
quired by President Nixon's executive privilege procedures. Id. at 227. See note 9
supra.
86 With respect to the "Pentagon Papers" confrontation, the matter was not one
of great national awareness until the documents became available to the public, well
after Senator Fulbright had requested that the study be provided to his committee.
R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 282-85 (1974). The
publicity, contributing to the likelihood that the President was aware of the situation,
makes plausible the possibility of a tacit understanding between the President and the
officials involved. See LIBRARY OF CONGRESS STUDY, supra note 10, at 226.
87 Department of Defense officials refused to permit the General Accounting Office
field staff in Greece to have access to information which the staff considered neces-
sary to its audit until the request was cleared at the Washington level. Senate Judiciary
Committee Hearing, supra note 8, at 314.
88 This was the reason for the refusal by the Department of Defense to provide
the requested Five-Year Plan for the Military Assistance Program to Congress in
June, 1969. Letter from Senator J. William Fulbright to Secretary Melvin Laird,
Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 8, at 40.
89 The refusal of the Department of Defense to provide to Congress monthly
statistical reports on military operations in Southeast Asia was supported by Deputy
Secretary of Defense David Packard
with the fact that, on the basis of custom, tradition, usage and prece-
dent, the Legislative and Executive Branches have come to accept and
recognize that there are certain matters which, for varying reasons, are
not normally discussed outside the Executive Branch.
Letter from Deputy Secretary David Packard to Senator Stuart Symington, June 11,
1970, Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 8, at 47.
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mation which may prove embarrassing to the persons or agency involved.,"
The General Accounting Office (GAO), which serves as the investigative
arm of Congress in monitoring agency efficiency, frequently experiences
assertions of agency privilege. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has
consistently refused to turn over to the GAO information concerning the
operation of the Economic Stabilization Program. 91 The position of the
IRS has been that the matter involves the administration of the internal
revenue laws and is, therefore, beyond the scope of the GAO's audit re-
sponsibility.92 The IRS would permit the complete audit to be carried out
only with a "memorandum of understanding," which the GAO felt would
restrict its independence and limit its access to necessary records. 9 The
GAO has also been restricted by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion (FDIC)94 in its audit of that agency. The FDIC has allowed access
only to those administrative or housekeeping records which pertain to its
financial transactions, and has limited the inspection of records concerning
the banks which it insures. 95
The GAO efforts to obtain information have on the whole been success-
ful because of its practice of developing a cooperative relationship with
the departments and agencies it audits. But Comptroller General Elmer B.
Staats has testified that assertions of agency privilege against -the GAO and
substantial procedural delays are increasing. 96
Some of the reasons advanced in asserting agency privilege appear to be
of great substance: the matter is still under adjudication; 9 an individual
90 The Library of Congress study on the limits of executive privilege concluded
that
the top-level policy makers apparently are happy to use the bureau-
cracy's tactics of delay and obfuscation to prevent Congress from
getting at information which might embarass [sic] their agency or their
administration.
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS STUDY, supra note 10, at 228.
91 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 122. Comptroller General Elmer Staats testified
that:
The Departments of Defense, State, and Treasury have employed de-
laying tactics in preventing our access to necessary records. Informa-
tion and records have been withheld on the basis that they were internal
working documents or that they disclosed tentative planning data. The
most serious interference has resulted from restraints placed upon
agency officials which require them with more and more frequency to





94 The General Accounting Office is required by section 17 of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1827 (1971), to conduct annual audits of the FDIC.
95 1 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 123.
96 1 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 114-16.
97 In one case, for example, the Department of Defense feared that various Army
documents delivered by the Justice Department to a Senate subcommittee would be
prejudicial to the Government's interest in a case then on remand for trial. Letter
from J. Fred Buzhardt, General Counsel of the Department of Defense, to Lawrence
Baskir, Chief Counsel and Staff Director, Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights, June 9, 1971, Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing, supra note 8, at 398.
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was promised confidentiality; 98 the agency believes that the request is be-
yond the scope of committee inquiry;99 or fear of harm to individuals
through exposure of raw files. 100
Occasionally, no reasons are offered. During the Kent State investigation,
Attorney General Richard Kleindienst refused to provide Senator Edward
Kennedy's Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure with
information concerning the Kent State disturbances. 10 Even though similar
information had been provided to the Scranton Commission, established
by President Nixon to investigate the incident in its general review of civil
disturbances, Senator Kennedy recalled Kleindienst stating: "I am not
taking executive privilege. I am just not going to make the material avail-
able."10 2 This is perhaps the clearest statement of a claim of agency
privilege distinct from that of executive privilege yet made. At least two
explanations for the Attorney General's position may be advanced. It is
possible that he did not want public disclosure of matters subject to future
litigation.' 0 3 Others have suggested that the statement represented merely
an active attempt to suppress the dissemination of information on the
incident.
104
Even the more substantive reasons for asserting agency privilege must
not be confused with the authority to make the assertions. Conceding the
validity of a particular rationale, the question of authority to make the
assertion in the first instance remains. Recent Presidents, having restricted
the exercise of executive privilege to themselves, have not indicated any
98 Secretary of Defense Laird asserted guarantees of confidentiality as a basis for
the refusal to provide Senator Fulbright with a copy of the "Pentagon Papers."
Laird stated: "Many of the contributions of this document were provided on the
basis of an expressed guarantee of confidentiality." Letter from Secretary Melvin
Laird to Senator J. William Fulbright, Dec. 20, 1969, Senate Judiciary Committee
Hearing, supra note 8, at 38.
99 John Dean asserted that information concerning presidential flights "has tradi-
tionally been considered personal to the President and thus not the proper subject of
Congressional inquiry." Letter from John W. Dean III, Counsel to the President,
to Elmer B. Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, Nov. 20, 1972, 3
Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 203.
100 In one case, for example, the Department of Defense sought to prevent publi-
cation in a committee report of references to certain public figures contained in
investigative files. Letter from J. Fred Buzhardt, General Counsel of the Department
of Defense, to Mr. Lawrence W. Baskir, Chief Counsel and Staff Director, Sub-
committee on Constitutional Rights, June 9, 1971, Senate Judiciary Committee Hear-
ing, supra note 8, at 398.
101 1 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 470.
102 2 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 19.
103 Id. Senator Kennedy implied that one of the purposes of the request was that
the parents of the students killed at Kent State might have access to the material. As
late as May 1972, the administration stated that the substance of the Kent State
matter was still under consideration even though Attorney General-designate Klein-
dienst had said earlier in 1972 that the Kent State file was closed. P. DAVIES, THE
TRUTH ABOUT KENT STATE 195 (1973).
104 Peter Davies' account of private attempts to force the Justice Department to
convene a grand jury clearly implies a purposeful suppression of the case. It was
not until May 10, 1973, after the indictment of former Attorney General John
Mitchell on charges of perjury and obstruction of justice, that the Justice Department
admitted it had for some time possessed evidence upon which it could have sought
the indictments of one to six guardsmen. id. at 203.
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desire to have department and agency officials make that determination. 10 5
Nor has the judiciary been a source of authority upon which agency and
department heads may rely.10 6 The Supreme Court has been favorably dis-
posed toward congressional power to investigate,' 07 particularly when
counterbalanced against the claims of department and agency officials. 108
In general, these assertions of agency privilege do not cite any express
constitutional, judicial, or executive authority in support of the right of
refusal to provide information. Beyond the fact that the assertions were
not made pursuant to presidential authority, it is clear in several instances
that the officials involved were aware at the time or were subsequently
made aware of the existing procedures for claiming executive privilege and
still did not comply with those procedures.' 09 The similarity of many of
the justifications given for assertions of agency privilege to those asserted
for executive privilege" ° leads to the suspicion that many executive officials
were attempting to shelter themselves beneath the executive privilege
umbrella without complying with executive privilege procedures."1 The
reasons for this phenomenon have not been clearly identified. These in-
stances may, in fact, have involved undisclosed presidential authorization
to exercise executive privilege. 112 Executive officials may be hesitant to
disturb a busy President for written authorization, but since they
would be pursuing a specific presidential directive when they sought
his authorization, this hesitancy is unwarranted. 113 Executive officials may
find it embarrassing not only to disclose the information to Congress but
also to reveal it to their superiors, but many of these assertions received
sufficient notoriety to make it likely that the President was aware of them.
114
105 See notes 8, 9 supra.
106 Bernard Schwartz concludes that even the "exposure for exposure's sake"
limitation with respect to the congressional investigation of private individuals is
not a limitation with respect to inquiries into the Executive. Citing McGrain v.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927), and Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957),
Schwartz analyzes the judicial emphasis given to the congressional investigative power
to support his assertion that "[wihere a congressional investigation is one into the
operation of a government agency, the scope of inquiry cannot b2 restricted." 1 B.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 7, at 128-29. See note 16 supra.
107 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957).
108 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
109 See notes 66, 72 supra.
110 See notes 60-64 and accompanying text supra.
111 See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
112 See notes 84-86 supra.
113 This hesitation may have been reflected in Senator Fulbright's attempt to ob-
tain the Department of Defense's Five-Year Plan for the Military Assistance Pro-
gram. Senator Fulbright's first inquiry brought a reply that the matter was receiving
careful consideration. His second inquiry elicited no response. His third inquiry,
mentioning a vote by the Committee on Foreign Relations to invoke statutory
authority to suspend funding of the Military Assistance Program, elicited a written
assertion of executive privilege by the President. Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing,
supra note 8, at 44-46.
114 Ten of the twenty assertions of agency privilege uncovered by the Library of
Congress report during the period 1962 through 1972 received coverage either in
the Washington papers or in the New York Times. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS STUDY,
supra note 10, at 224-26.
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The most plausible reason seems to be that executive officials were given
authority under many pre-1960 administrations to exercise executive
privilege and felt that this authority thereafter became permanently fixed.115
Despite reasons suggested by the above-discussed examples, agency priv-
ilege can claim no greater constitutional authority than that possessed by
executive privilege and, upon analysis, much less.116 Even defenders of
agency privilege recognize the possibility of delegation by the President to
department and agency heads of the power to exercise the privilege, imply-
ing a lack of power in those positions at present. 117 The arguments which
are claimed to give at least indirect constitutional support to executive
privilege are based on the principle of separation of powers. 118 The powers
of the federal government are allocated to its three branches; 119 the power
in the executive branch is established in the Presidency. 120 Therefore,
assuming a power of privilege in the executive branch, it is a power of
privilege in the President and not a power of other members of the Execu-
tive unless so delegated by the President. 121 When the President does not
delegate this power, but instead clearly directs that any claim of justifica-
tion to withhold information from Congress must be personally exercised
by the President, other members of the Executive lack any power to with-
115 The directive issued by President Eisenhower on May 17, 1954, which sought
to restrict members of the executive branch from testifying before a subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Government Operations was used extensively by
subordinates in the Executive as a claim of authority to withhold information from
Congress. A. BRECKENRIDGE, THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 58 (1974). As the Library
of Congress research staff concluded, "That cloak [of executive privilege] no longer
exists, but the bureaucracy that used it is little changed." LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
STUDY, supra note 10, at 228.
116 The "privilege" involved both in executive privilege and agency privilege is
one asserted in the executive branch. The Constitution vests the powers of the
Executive in the President. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. Therefore, the power of priv-
ilege in the President would, if a constitutional power, be the maximum power of
privilege in the executive branch. Any privilege claim by another member of the
Executive could not be greater than that of the President, and, since recent Presidents
have asserted that privilege may only be claimed by the President, other members
of the Executive who assert a privilege are necessarily basing it upon something less
than constitutional authority.
117 Kramer & Marcuse, supra note 2, at 911.
118 E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 144 (rev. ed. H.
Chase & C. Ducat 1973).
119 Justice Holmes argued that any power not clearly lodged in one of the three
branches fell to the legislature to determine how it should be exercised. Springer v.
Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 211 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
120 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
121 The issue of whether an act by a subordinate sufficed to constitute an act of the
President arose in Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 82 (1973), a
case involving the classified documents exemption of the Freedom of Information Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). The legislative history of the exemption indicated that the Presi-
dent was to determine if the exempted matter should be kept secret. The material
involved had in fact been classified by subordinates, but the Court found that the
President, rather than reserving his power to himself, had delegated the power to his
subordinates through Executive Order 10501, which had been the basis upon which
the subordinates classified the documents. Absent the delegation of power, the
Court stated, the act of the subordinate would not have been sufficient. 410 U.S. at 82.
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hold information which the Constitution vests in the executive branch. 122
It is clear, therefore, that agency and department heads cannot rely
upon the Constitution to support a general claim of agency privilege,
although the possibility still exists that individual claims may find specific
support in statutory authority.
B. Statutory Authority
In some instances, an individual assertion of agency privilege is claimed
on the authority of a statute. The incidence of such support, however, is
low.
John W. Dean III, while serving as White House counsel to President
Nixon, withheld information from the GAO concerning presidential flights
and passengers.' 2 3 The reason given was that the information was personal
to the President and that adequate information was available to the GAO
through alternative sources, in this case the financial reports of the Com-
mittee to Re-elect the President. 124 Attorney General Kleindienst, in re-
sponse to an inquiry concerning the matter, specifically stated that Mr.
Dean did not invoke executive privilege.1 2 5 He asserted that Mr. Dean was
instead pursuing statutory authority12 6 for the claim that the President's
travel expenses are discretionary and accounted for only on his request.
27
The statutory authority was not mentioned in Mr. Dean's letter refusing
to provide the information, and it is not clear whether the statute is in fact
sufficient justification. Comptroller General Elmer Staats, in testimony con-
cerning this incident, stated that such information had been made available
on request of Congress by previous administrations to determine if proper
reimbursement had been made for political use of government aircraft. 128
A statute which authorized department heads to maintain custody and
control of the documents in their possession 129 was amended in 1958130 to
prevent its use to facilitate the withholding of information. 1  Congress
122 The President's subordinates may claim a privilege separate in origin from his,
but they may properly assert such a privilege only under a regulation, statute, or order,
not under the Constitution. A. BRECKENRIDGE, THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 2 (1974).
See W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS § 24.31
(1960); E. GRIFFITH, CONGRESS: ITS CONTEMPORARY ROLE 2 (2d ed. 1956).
123 Letter from John W. Dean III to Elmer B. Staats, Nov. 20, 1972, 3 Joint
Hearings, supra note 3, at 203. See 1 id. at 126.
124 1 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 126.
125 Enclosure to letter from Attorney General Richard Kleindienst to Senator Sam
Ervin, May 15, 1973, 3 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 218.
126 3 U.S.C. § 103 (1975), which provides:
There may be expended for or on account of the traveling expenses of
the President of the United States such sum as Congress may from time
to time appropriate, not exceeding $40,000 per annum, such sum when
appropriated to be expended in the discretion of the President and ac-
counted for on his certificate solely.
127 See note 125 supra.
128 1 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 126.
1295 U.S.C. § 301 (1970).
1310 72 Stat. 547 (1958).
131 Berger, supra nete 2, at 1308-09.
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specified in the Freedom of Information Act 1 32 that, merely because certain
categories of information may be withheld from the public, the Act created
no authority for withholding information from Congress. 133 The analysis
of specific claims of agency privilege reveals that the rationale proffered
seldom has a statutory basis.
C. Delegated Authority
Some future President might decide to delegate to subordinates the
privilege to withhold information." 4 Nevertheless, the distinctions drawn
as to agency privilege would be relevant to assertions of privilege by those
members of the Executive to whom the power was not delegated. It is
likely, however, that Congress would be less willing to acquiesce to the
exercise of delegated executive privilege by agencies. 135 In any case, agen-
cies (and perhaps Presidents) are unwilling to rest claims of privilege upon
express delegation in many cases. 136
IV. LEGISLATING THE PROPER BOUNDS OF
AGENCY PRIVILEGE
The foregoing analysis of the authority underlying the assertion of
agency privilege and the occasions of its use has revealed that there may
exist some limited statutory authority justifying some rather specific .and
narrow claims of privilege."
37
Members of Congress have expressed concern about the continued
assertion of privilege in the form of various legislative proposals which
seek a statutory definition of executive privilege rather than leaving its
132 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
133 See note 139 and accompanying text infra.
134 This, in a sense, is what President Eisenhower did in 1954. See note 5 supra.
See also A. BRECKENRIDGE, THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 58 (1974), discussing the
effect of Eisenhower's actions in 1954.
135 In 1962, political peace was at least temporarily established as to the exercise
of executive privilege through the President's willingness to restrict its exercise to
himself alone.
In a carefully staged scenario in 1962 stemming from a dispute over
whether or not a Senate subcommittee was entitled to know the names of
Defense Department officials who had censored speeches of Generals
and Admirals, Secretary of Defense McNamara appeared before the
subcommittee and read a letter to him from President Kennedy direct-
ing him (McNamara) not to testify about certain matters .... Senator
Stennis, the Chairman of the subcommittee, obviously prepared for the
event, "read from prepared notes and annotated transcripts of court de-
cisions and Congressional hearings to justify his ruling" to accept the
President's plea. Subsequent events indicate the precedent has been set.
If the President himself indicates in writing that he does not want his
subordinates to testify, the congressional committee will usually let the
matter drop there.
E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 145 (rev. ed. H. Chase
& C. Ducat 1973).
136 See part III A supra.
137 See part III B supra.
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definition to presidential order. The byproduct of these proposals would
be to make illegal any exercise of privilege beyond that clearly delineated.
The Freedom of Information Act 138 limits the extent to which depart-
ments and agencies may withhold information from the public. Prior to
1975, the Act provided that none of its provisions could be a basis for
withholding information from Congress. 139 In 1975, amendments were
proposed calling for an affirmative congressional right to information.
140
The proposed amendments recognized no authority to withhold information
138 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
139 Subsection (c) of the statute reads:
This section does not authorize withholding of information or limit the
availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated in
this section. This section is not authority to withhold information from
Congress.
5 U.S.C. § 552 (c) (1970). In Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1071-72 n.9 (D.C. Cir.
1971), the court stated that the power of Congress to compel disclosure of agency
records to the public is no greater than its power to compel disclosure to Congress
itself.
140S. 1142, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 5425, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
The relevant portions of S. 1142 read:
Section 552 (c) of title 5. United States Code, is amended to read as
follows:
"(c) (1) This section does not authorize withholding of information
or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically
stated in this section.
"(2) (A) Notwithstanding subsection (b), any agency shall furnish
any information or records to Congress or any committee of Congress
promptly upon written request to the head of such agency by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President of the Senate,
or the chairman of any such committee, as the case may be.
"(B) For purposes of this paragraph, the term 'committee of Congress'
means any committee of the Senate or House of Representatives or any
subcommittee of any such committee or any joint committee of Con-
gress or any subcommittee of any such committee or any joint com-
mittee of Congress or any subcommittee of any such joint committee."
Section 552 of title 5, United States Code, is amended by adding at
the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(d) Each agency shall, on or before March 1 of each calendar year,
submit a report to the Committee on Government Operations of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Government Opera-
tions of the Senate which shall include-
"(1) the number of requests for records made to such agency under
subsection (a);
"(2) the number of determinations made by such agency not to com-
ply with any such request, and the reasons for each such determination;
"(3) the number of appeals made by persons under subsection (a) (5)
(B);
"(4) the number of days taken by such agency to make any deter-
mination regarding any request for records and regarding any appeal;
"(5) the number of complaints made under subsection (a) (3);
"(6) a copy of any rule made by such agency regarding this section;
and
"(7) such other information as will indicate efforts to administer fully
this section;
during the preceding calendar year."
See I Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 507-09.
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in either the President or other members of the executive branch.1 41 As
finally enacted, however, the section remained unchanged. 42
Senator J. William Fulbright introduced a bill which would have forbid-
den the assertion of privilege before a congressional committee without a
signed claim of privilege by the President.143 This, in substance, was an
attempt to define a scope of executive privilege coextensive with that
asserted by recent Presidents, with the additional requirement that the
approval be in writing.' 44 The bill provided that the requesting committee
could evaluate the assertion and, if the President denied information to the
committee, submit the request to Congress for resolution. 145 By implica-
tion, it gave legal recognition by the Congress to certain claims of
privilege.' 46 If constitutional authority exists for a privilege, Congress
cannot limit that authority by statute.147 The privilege would not be a
privilege at all if subject to congressional approval, 148 but the basic struc-
141 This provision was attacked as unconstitutional by the Department of Justice,
alleging a violation of separation of powers. 1 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 514.
142 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. 1975), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
143S. 858, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
144 Section 306(b) of the Fulbright bill provided:
In no case shall an employee of the executive branch appearing before
the Congress, any joint committee of the Congress, any committee of
either House of the Congress, or any subcommittee of any such com-
mittee, in response to a summons or request, assert executive privilege
unless the employee presents, at the time executive privilege is asserted
in response to any testimony or document sought, a statement signed
personally by the President requiring that the employee assert executive
privilege as to the testimony or document sought.
S. 858, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 306(b) (1973). Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and
Nixon also required specific approval by the President for the assertion of execu-
tive privilege, but not necessarily a signed statement. See notes 8, 9 supra.
145 Section 306(c) of the Fulbright bill provided:
When such an employee presents such statement, it shall then be a
question of fact for the committee to decide (including, in the case of
the assertion of such privilege before a subcommittee, for the com-
mittee of such subcommittee to decide) whether the assertion of execu-
tive privilege is well taken. If not well taken, the employee shall be
ordered to provide the testimony or document sought. When any such
committee, unholds [sic] or denies the assertion of executive privilege,,
it shall within ten days file with its House of Congress (or, in the case
of a joint committee, with each House of Congress) a resolution, to-
gether with a report and record of its proceedings bearing on such
assertion of executive privilege, and shall take such action as such
House or Houses deems proper on disposition of any such resolution.
S. 858, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 306(c) (1973).
146 1 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 250.
147 Attorney General Kleindienst, speaking from a position claiming such con-
stitutional authority, testified: "The clause [quoted note 144 supra] would point
toward congressional supremacy inconsistent with the separation-of-powers system
and doctrine." 1 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 26.
148 Attorney General Kleindienst further testified:
We also have serious difficulties with that aspect of the proposed legis-
lation which would purport to make it a question of fact for the
committee to decide whether an assertion of privilege is well taken.
We deal here, as often in the constitutional field, with a fact/law inter-
face. and not with a simple question of fact.
1 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 26.
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ture of the bill implied a presumptive executive privilege. The bill suffered
from other definitional and procedural problems, 149 although its signifi-
cance now is primarily historical. 150
Senator Adlai E. Stevenson III has suggested that legislation be drafted
which would define when executive privilege may be properly invoked' 51
and also establish the congressional right to obtain information in the
broadest terms and refuse to give any person a blanket exemption from
testifying.' 52 This proposal, like the Fulbright bill, would require the
President to certify a claim of the right to withhold and to provide his
reasons for withholding information; the proposal would also limit executive
privilege by statute and make exercises of agency privilege illegal. 153 The
Stevenson proposal, like that of Senator Fulbright, would be unacceptable
to those who refuse to acknowledge that any privilege exists.5 4 Unlike the
Fulbright bill, which left the resolution of any conflict to the discretion of
Congress, 155 the Stevenson proposal includes detailed procedures to re-
solve the conflict, proposing appointment of a special prosecutor who
might seek court resolution of a dispute. 156
In its recommendation that conflicts be resolved by the courts, the
Stevenson proposal is similar to a bill sponsored by Senator Edward M.
Kennedy, which proposed the conferral of exclusive original jurisdiction
149 The bill has been criticized for its tendency to sanctify a right to executive
privilege, its failure to define limits for the exercise of the privilege, and its lack
of procedures to resolve impasses. Note, Executive Privilege and the Congress:
Perspectives and Recommendations, 23 DEPAUL L. REV. 692, 731-34 (1974).
150 The bill was never enacted and its sponsor is no longer a member of the
Senate.
151 Senator Stevenson criticized Senator Fulbright's bill for failing to define the
proper role of executive privilege and set out his proposed definition:
I therefore would suggest that direct communications between the
President and anyone in the executive branch should be protected-if
the matters in discussion legitimately relate to aspects of public policy.
. .. What about other communications within the executive branch?
. . . First of all, a sine qua non to the invocation of executive priv-
ilege should be that the information is protected from disclosure
under other acts such as the Freedom of Information Act or the Budget
and Accounting Act. Then, where the information is so protected, the
President himself should certify the right to withhold information in
these cases.
I Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 95.
152 Senator Stevenson suggested a preamble broadly asserting congressional power
to obtain information:
Congress should be wary of giving away any of its legitimate constitu-
tional power. The present bills on this subject do not make sufficiently
clear Congress' broad power; they tend to sanctify a right to executive
privilege, without stating clearly and forthrightly Congress' concomitant
right to obtain information.
1 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 94.
153 Id. at 94-95. See note 151 supra.
154 1 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 250. See note 146 and accompanying text
supra.
155 See note 145 supra.
156 1 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 96.
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on the District Court of the District of Columbia to adjudicate conflicts
over claims of agency privilege which reached an impasse between Con-
gress and members of the Executive.'5 7 Such proposals could force an
eventual Supreme Court determination of whether agency privilege has
any constitutional basis. 158 The Supreme Court may wish to avoid a de-
cision on an issue when the controversy is politically charged. 159 Such
circumstances create a danger that the Court might be disobeyed. Thus,
leaving the resolution of the issue to the political process avoids the con-
stitutional crisis which might otherwise ensue. 160 It has been pointed out
that there is greater controversy over congressional access to the informa-
tion of departments and agencies when different parties control the two
branchs.' 6 1 To the extent that an assertion of agency privilege does not
rest upon a presidential claim of executive privilege, there is less likelihood
that the question is so politically charged that the Court will fear that its
decision will be unenforceable. 1 2 Thus, matters of agency privilege may
stand a greater chance of judicial resolution than matters of executive
privilege.
Proposals for the resolution of privilege conflicts in the courts have been
attacked by former Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr., who feels that the Supreme
Court has already recognized Congress' power to investigate. 16 3 He has
pointed out that such a time-consuming process would work to the
advantage of the departments and agencies. In many instances delay would
be defeat for Congress, since the information would not be available when
needed. 64 Ervin argues that, since Congress already has the power to
157 S. 2073, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
158 This result is all the more likely after the litigation over the Nixon tapes.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), has been interpreted as rejecting the
argument that there is no constitutional basis at all for executive privilege. Westin,
The Case for America, in UNITED STATES v. NIXON (L. Friedman ed. 1974). This
may thrust the federal courts into a greater role in deciding executive-legislative con-
flicts, a role which the courts have avoided in the past. In Alan Westin's words:
What it will mean in practice . . . is that from now on, the federal
courts have been given the role of arbitrating both the general definitions
and the document-by-document review of those presidential communica-
tions that may become central to criminal proceedings.
Id. at xxi.
159 Justice Brandeis has outlined the techniques used by the Court to avoid con-
stitutional issues. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (concurring
opinion).
160 Westin, The Case for America, in UNITED STATES v. NIXON xii-xiii (L. Fried-
man ed. 1974). See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208-32 (1962), for an analysis of
what the Supreme Court defines a political question to be.
161 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS STUDY, supra note 10, at 227. The report also points
out, however, that instances of assertion of agency privilege are not uncommon when
both branches are controlled by the same party. Id.
162 Although United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), might be characterized
as politically charged, Alan Westin contends that public opinion was solidly against
the President, making the decision very predictable. Westin, The Case for America, in
UNITED STATES v. NIXON xii-xiv (L. Friedman ed. 1974).
163 1 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 99-100.
164 Id. at 99. Ervin's illustration is the Watergate investigation.
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obtain information, it should issue a warrant for the arrest of a recalcitrant
and send out the Sergeant at Arms to bring him before the bar of the parent
body. 165 The concept does have some historical support,166 but the Sergeant
at Arms might well find himself outmatched by a recalcitrant executive
branch.
167
The prospects for legislative action depend in part on the authority
underlying agency privilege. 16 8 If United States v. Nixon 169 has recognized
some constitutional basis for executive privilege claims in certain areas,
1'70
Congress cannot exert its will to undercut that privilege; the source of the
authority determines the strength of the privilege. 1'7 1 By implication, it is
only the President, and not Congress, who can limit claims of executive
privilege to those made on the strength of his specific authorization. How-
ever, United States v. Nixon speaks only of privileges of the President, not
executive branch privilege. 172 The conclusion is still valid, therefore, that
agency privilege as here defined has no constitutional basis and conse-
quently is subject to the will of Congress. 173 To the extent that the Fulbright
and Stevenson proposals and the proposed amendment to the Freedom of
Information Act would limit executive branch privilege to presidential
exercise thereof, there would appear to be no conflict with United States
v. Nixon. The Fulbright bill, by refusing to define the scope of executive
branch privilege and merely requiring a presidential assertion, comes
closest to avoiding conflict.
Leaving aside the question of constitutional power, Senator Ervin's
argument that Congress has all the power it needs raises the question of
whether any legislation is necessary. The Fulbright bill leaves to Congress
the determination of appropriate action,174 but this gives Congress nothing
165 Id. Bishop, The Executive Right of Privacy: An Unresolved Constitutional
Question, 66 YALE L.J. 477, 484 (1957) provides a general analysis of the use of the
Sergeant at Arms.
166 See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
167 Senator Ablai Stevenson III testified concerning his reservations as to its use:
Some, including Senator Ervin and Senator Kennedy, have suggested
that Congress resort to its own remedies-the contempt power; that
Congress send the Sergeant at Arms out to place the individual in cus-
tody, arraign him, and try him-or have the courts try him-for Con-
tempt of Congress.
This has never been done. And I would suggest that these remedies
are unnecessarily contentious and perhaps at best futile.
1 Joint Hearings, supra note 3, at 96.
168 Congress can legislate with respect to common law and statutory privileges
but cannot regulate constitutional privileges. Comment, Executive Privileges: What
Are the Limits?, 54 ORE. L. REV. 81, 83 (1975).
169418 U.S. 683 (1974).
170 See note 158 supra.
171 Comment, Executive Privileges: What Are the Limits?, 54 ORE. L. REV. 81, 83
(1975).
172 See Westin, The Case for America, in UNITED STATES V. NIXON XXi (L. Fried-
man ed. 1974).
173 See note 122 and accompanying text supra.
174 See note 145 supra.
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that it does not already have. If Congress has the right to restrict assertions
of agency privilege, it has it without additional legislation.
Agency privilege is more a political than a constitutional problem. 75
As a political problem, it is best left to the political process. 176 Where de-
partments and agencies lack authority for their assertions, Congress must be
willing to pursue the matter until a presidential privilege claim is provoked
in an attempt to bring about the production of testimony and documents
desired. Where departments and agencies assert statutory authority for
their privilege, Congress has the power to legislate with respect to that
statute.1'77 Congress has too willingly created an executive bureaucracy with-
out providing the means to monitor its efficiency and to determine whether
executive agencies fulfill their intended purposes. 178 Annual budgetary re-
view has not been performed with a diligence sufficient to provide signifi-
cant control. 179 Congress needs, more than additional legislation, develop-
ment of a coordinated approach to information-gathering by the GAO
and congressional committees which will enable it to assert its positions
effectively while maintaining responsible control over its individual mem-
bers and committees with respect to the information sought and its dis-
closure.' 8 0 Agency privilege has filled a vacuum of power left by Congress
and must be met by finding in Congress a countervailing power.18'
V. CONCLUSION
An express constitutional basis for agency privilege does not exist.1
8 2
The concept has long been insulated from analysis of the precise privilege
and authority involved in the assertion by confusion of agency privilege
with executive privilege. 8 3 Absent a presidential claim of privilege en-
compassing assertions of agency privilege, Congress may act effectively to
control its use. 8 4 But the executive departments and agencies are largely
creatures of Congress and will continue to assert the power of privilege
until Congress finds the will to check its creations.' 8 5 By segregating asser-
175 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS STUDY, supra note 10, at 227.
176 See 2 C. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 672-73 (1969).
177 Congress took such action with respect to the Departmental Regulations
Statute, 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1971). See note 131 and accompanying text supra.
178 See THE AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, THE CONGRESS AND
AMERICA'S FUTURE 102-09 (1965).
179 See E. GRIFFITH, CONGRESS: ITS CONTEMPORARY ROLE 90-99 (2d rev. ed. 1956).
(1956).
1
8 0 See P. DONHAM & R. FAHEY, CONGRESS NEEDS HELP 181-203 (1966).
181 For an analysis of the development of bureaucratic power, see A. DE GRAZIA,
REPUBLIC IN CRISIS 109-44 (1965).
182 See note 122 and accompanying text supra.
183 See Comment, Executive Privileges: What Are the Limits?, 54 ORE. L. REV. 81
(1975).
184 Congress therefore can control assertions of privilege as long as they have at
most a statutory basis. See notes 131, 168 and accompanying text supra.
185 See note 181 supra.
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tions of privilege which fall into the agency privilege category, Congress
may be able to develop effective procedures to deal with them even though
the conflict over executive privilege remains unresolved. The area is one
in which careful attention to definition and procedure may reduce conflict
and prevent attempts to withhold documents and testimony under an ill-
defined umbrella of privilege. No new statutes are necessary to create the
distinction in the minds of department and agency officials; all that is
needed is an awareness that Congress recognizes that distinction and will
act upon it.
-Mark A. Luscombe
